Fixing the Wheel: A Critical Analysis of
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In 1990, Congress attempted to fill a long-standing void in the
United States immigration laws by providing an updated immigrant investor visa codified as section 203(b)(5) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act. The old, obsolete immigrant investor visa
had only required a $40,000 investment. The new visa generally
requires a $1,000,000 investment. The demand for this new higher
priced version has, however, been exceedingly low. Although this
immigrant investor visa category allows for 10,000 visa issuances
per year, only 78 were issued in fiscal 1992 and no more than 500
are expected to be issued in fiscal 1993. This Article examines
negative factors suppressing demand for the immigrant investor
visa and recommends constructive changes designed to allow the
visa to reach its full potential as a vehicle for attractingforeign
investment and creating American jobs.
INTRODUCTION

The highly anticipated Alien Entrepreneur Immigrant Investor
Visa Category' was expected to deliver significant benefits to the
United States economy, including huge amounts of capital flowing
into the United States, jobs being created, and a vital new source of
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1. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 203(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5)
(1988), amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(5) (Supp. 11 1990).

equity financing becoming available to American business developers. Those high hopes soon turned into profound disappointment. To
date, the United States immigrant investment program has been a
major failure. What went wrong? And more importantly, what can
be done to fix it?

The answer to the first question is manyfold. In strict business
terms, America overestimated its market value. Congress examined
the programs offered by Canada and Australia. Canadian permanent
residence cost $250,0002 and Australian status cost $365,000. 3
Accordingly, the American green card should come at a premium,
America being the greatest recipient of immigration from around the
world, 4 the ultimate destination for the dislocated, the promised
land. Thus, the figure of $1,000,000 was set." This sum was deemed
to be a sufficient investment to generate the required ten new jobs.'

The $1,000,000 price tag was almost four times the price of competing foreign programs. The $500,000 option available for investments into rural and high unemployment zones 7 was still twice the
investment required for Canada and substantially more than the
Australian program. More importantly these figures did not consider
a critical hidden cost factor of United States permanent residency,
namely additional taxes following from United States tax residency
status."

2. Canadian permanent residence status is granted pursuant to Immigration Regulation, section 2 of the Canada Immigration Act (1978), to foreign investors with the
requisite business experience who invest $250,000 Canadian dollars in government approved funds.
3. The Australian Business Skills Migration Visa requires an investment of
$500,000 Australian dollars, or roughly the equivalent of $365,000 United States dollars
at current exchange rates. DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND
ETHNIC AFFAIRS, MIGRATING TO AUSTRALIA.' BUSINESS SKILLS MIGRATION REQUIRE-

MENTS (1992). The Australian investment program is again in operation after having
been suspended due to a rash of fraudulent applications, particularly from Hong Kong.
4. The United States receives more immigrants per year than all of the rest of the
world combined. 136 CONG. REC. H12366 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Bryant of Texas regarding the Immigration Act of 1990).
5. INA § 203(b)(5)(C)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988), amended by 8 U.S.C. §
I153(b)(5)(C)(i) (Supp. 11 1990).
6. INA § 203(b)(5)(A)(iii), 8-U.S.C. § 1153 (1988), amended by 8 U.S.C. §
l153(b)(5)(A)(iii) (Supp. 11 1990). This act requires creation of full-time employment
for no fewer than 10 United States workers. Id.
7. INA § 203(b)(5)(c)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988), amended by 8 U.S.C. §
1153(b)(5)(C)(ii) (Supp. 11 1990). The Attorney General is given discretion to lower the
required amount of capital investment for targeted employment areas. The figure may
not, however, be lowered less than one-half of the $1,000,000 figure. Id. The Attorney
General designated $500,000 as being the required capital investment for targeted employment areas. INS Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(0(2) (1991).
8. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(l)(A)(i) allows a lawfully admitted permanent resident of the
United States to become a United States resident for tax purposes upon such admission
provided he meet other tests. See generally I.R.C. § 7701(b)(l)(A) (1992).
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I.

EFFECTS OF UNITED STATES TAXES ON
IMMIGRATION INVESTOR VISAS

Unlike most industrialized countries, the United States taxes its
citizens with residences abroad on income earned from foreign
sources. Significantly, Canada, its main competitor in the safe-haven
residency market, does not impose such a tax burden. 9 The difference can be dramatic. For example, suppose a wealthy Hong Kong
entrepreneur is considering the options in light of the uncertainty
stemming from a takeover of the Crown Colony by the People's
Republic of China in 1997. For purposes of illustration assume that'
the entrepreneur's Hong Kong business interests provide an annual
income of $1,000,000. The effective tax rate in Hong Kong on this
income is 17.5%.10 Accordingly, the entrepreneur would pay
$175,000 in taxes on this income. If this person simultaneously held
Canadian citizenship, but resided in Asia, the yearly tax bill on the
Hong Kong based income would still only be $175,000 per year
because Canada does not tax offshore income. Yet with United
States permanent resident or citizenship status (and hence United
States tax resident status), then the entrepreneur's annual tax bill on
this same income would be $410,00011 regardless of where the person actually lived. Thus, the Hong Kong entrepreneur would effectively be paying an annual license fee of $235,000 per year for the
privilege of having United States permanent residence or citizenship
status. Coupled with the additional investment initially required, the
effective cost of United States permanent residency has understandably been deemed prohibitive by many potential foreign investors.
The launch date for this new program was also unfortunate. A
similar investor immigrant visa was originally proposed in Congress
in the early 1980s. 12 Between that original proposal and the effective
9. See Nathan Boidman, Tax Havens Encyclopaedia, in 29 CAN. L. & PRAC. 8
(Butterworth & Co. ed., 1990).
10.

HONG KONG INLAND REVENUE SERVICE PROFITS TAX-CORPORATE RATE TAX

SCHEDULE (1992). This example assumes that the Hong Kong entrepreneur's business is
being conducted in a corporate form. Types of income other than profits from an operating business may be taxed at a different rate. It is significant to note that there are no
capital gain taxes in Hong Kong.
11. The 41 % effective tax rate applied in this example is a typical blended tax rate
for corporations located in states such as California where the 34% federal corporate tax
rate is supplemented by an effective 7% state corporate tax rate. Interview with Simon
Lee, Certified Public Accountant, Managing Partner, Lee, Quan, Ho, and Le, in San
Francisco, CA (1992).
12. Several attempts to include an immigrant investor visa into legislation were
defeated in Congress during the early and mid 1980s. The most significant example was

enactment date of section 203(b)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, significant amounts of capital had been invested into
Canada by individuals participating in their residency program. 13
Thus arises the question of whether the best pools for potential for-

eign investors, such as Hong Kong and other wealthy countries facing political instability, had already been exhausted by the time

Congress enacted the program.
Another chilling effect upon potential immigrant investment from
these markets was the profound recession which struck the United
States at the time that the program was introduced. 14 The difference

between potential return- on investment was striking. For example, a
major investment into a hotel enterprise in Hong Kong during these
years was likely to yield a higher return on investment than a similar
investment into the troubled United States hotel industry due to a
significant disparity in occupancy rates.15 Hotels are a good yardstick investment as they involve real estate, which is preferred by
foreign investors, and supply a significant amount of jobs, which is
critical to meeting the section 203(b)(5) job creation requirements.
Therefore, the immigrant investor program threw three economic
strikes against the foreign investor: higher initial capital investment
requirements, lower return on investment, and higher effective taxes

on overall business operations.
The regulatory purgatory that existed for the program during the

critical initial launch period of November 1990 to November 1991
only compounded the shaky start of the program. The failure of the
its deletion from the Simpson-Mazzoli bill originally sponsored in 1981 and finally passed
in an evolved form as the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub L. No. 99603, 100 Stat. 335a.
13. See Gary Endelman & Jeffrey Hardy, Uncle Sam Wants You: Foreign Investment and ImmigrationAct of 1990, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV, 671, 680 (1991). This article
indicates that two billion dollars have been invested into Vancouver alone by Hong Kong
investors. Id.
14. While the United States economy has been languishing, Hong Kong has had
positive economic growth. The economic growth of the Colony recently surged to a 4.7%
increase in the first quarter of 1992 alone. HONG KONG GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
SERVICES, HONG KONG: THE FACTS (1992). The same publication indicates a 2.7 % positive growth for 1989 and 2.8% growth rate for 1990 in the gross domestic product of
Hong Kong. Id.
15. Hotel occupancy rates averaged 64% in the United States for 1991 according
to the San Francisco Convention & Visitors Bureau. The occupancy rate in Hong Kong
for the same period was 75%. HONG KONG TOURIST ASSOCIATION, A STATISTICAL
REVIEW OF TOURISM (1991). Further information from these sources indicates that room
rentals decreased in the major United States tourist destination city of San Francisco by
2.5% in 1991 while room rentals increased 5.4% during the same time in Hong Kong.
Annual profits for Hong Kong hotels averaged a striking 19.6% in 1991. Id. Four more
hotels with a total of 3,000 rooms are scheduled to open by 1994 in Hong Kong. This
building is cited as an indication of continuing confidence by investors in the Hong Kong
hotel industry. HONG KONG TOURIST ASSOCIATION. HONG KONG INFORMATION NOTE
(Aug. 1992).
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Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to publish final regulations for this extended time period effectively killed any momentum generated by initial interest in the program. For twelve months
all potential projects were on hold due to the uncertainty. No one
would invest into a program where the rules were not in place.
After surviving this difficult incubation period, the immigrant
investor period is now finally showing signs of life. The final regulations are in place."6 The new forms have been printed and are available for use."7 Applications have been approved and immigrant
investors are actually entering the United States under the program. 8 This could have a significant breaking-the-dam effect. The
fact that green cards are being issued to the initial investors will help
to break down the reluctance of other potential immigrant investors
to participate in the program.
The economic performance of these initial investments will also be
a critical factor in the long-term success of the immigrant investor
program. The otherwise successful Canadian program was plagued
by instances in which the investor lost money on the required investment or was the victim of outright fraud by unscrupulous promoters.
If the initial capital infusions into the United States program turn
out to be bona fide, relatively safe investments with a reasonable, if
not spectacular, return on investment, then the stigma that tainted
the Canadian program will not develop. This could be a key competitive advantage for the American program.
Whether such desired initial investment results will come to pass
is an open question. The structure of the United States immigrant
investment program as contrasted to the Canadian model contains a
free-market mechanism. Whereas Canada supported certain projects
based upon the perceived benefits to the economic interests of the
country, or a particular province, the United States program does
not precertify specific projects. In other words, specific projects are
not evaluated in order to determine at a bureaucratic level whether
the project will yield the economic results contemplated in the legislation. The only concession to such a central economic planning

16. INS Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 204.6 (1991).
17. The new updated 1-526 Immigrant Petition by Alien Entrepreneur was
released on December 2, 1991.
18. There had been 330 § 203(b)(5) immigrant investor applications filed and 30
cases approved as of June 1992. Edward Skerrett, INS Central Office Representative,
Report at the Annual Meeting of the American Immigration Lawyer Association (June
1992).

approach is the provision in the program to allow reduced investments into rural or high unemployment areas, and the guarantee of
3,000 of the 10,000 available immigrant visas to these targeted zone
investments.1 9
The United States program otherwise generally takes a hands-off
economic approach. Thus, a project can generally be evaluated on
strictly economic criteria. Unlike Canada, however, the United
States government probably will not have any input into the structuring of a project, nor self-interest in furthering the success of an
individual project, because Congress gave the foreign investors participating in the United States program the freedom to choose their
own economic fate as long as ten employed Americans share the investor's destiny. 0 This means that some investments will inevitably
fail as the natural result of economic Darwinism. Such failures are
bound to occur due to poor business judgement, inadequate management skills, undercapitalization, unexpected economic trends, or onetime fatal financial setbacks.
Nonetheless, the INS and other federal agencies such as the
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), as well as appropriate state
regulatory agencies,2" can use their compliance and enforcement
powers to ensure that needless business failures do not result from
fraudulent actions of overreaching United States business promoters.
The legislation itself provides mechanisms to prosecute individuals
who attempt to obtain permanent residency status through fraudulent means. It does not, however, contain any express provisions that
would empower the INS or the Attorney General to prosecute
unscrupulous American promoters who might prey on unsuspecting
foreign investors. The desire for United States permanent residency
status or the ignorance of accepted American business practices may
act as blinders to foreign investors who are attracted by the spectacular returns promised in a highly promoted project. Such projects
might be merely a facade to a fraudulent operation or a nonfraudulent but dubious economic venture based upon inflated financial projections. In either case, the likelihood of a happy ending for the
immigrant investor is slim. In order to safeguard the integrity and
marketability of the immigrant investor program, the INS must
19. INA § 203(b)(5)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (1988), amended by, 8 U.S.C.
I153(b)(5)(B)(i) (Supp. 11 1990).
20. INS Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(e) (1992). The employment
must be at least 35 hours per week. The 10 full-time workers must be employed at the
enterprise by at least the two-year anniversary of the approval of the initial 1-526 petition. Skerrett, supra note 18.
21. Many of the new commercial enterprises acting as vehicles for § 203(b)(5)
related investments will be issuing securities in a manner that will probably fall under
the jurisdiction of the Securities Exchange Commission pursuant to the Securities Act of
1933, as well as state securities regulation.
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coordinate with other relevant federal and state agencies in weeding
out these economic predators. The long-term viability and success of

the United States immigrant investor program will significantly
depend upon how well the integrity of the program is protected by
timely and aggressive enforcement actions by the appropriate regulatory bodies. The perception of the program as a fair, straight-forward investment proposition may counter-balance the negative
economic factors, such as higher investment requirements, because it
is human nature to be willing to pay more for a product with a reliable name. In this regard, keeping the program free of fraudulent
projects is- within the power of the INS 22 and the government in gen-

eral. In a program generally left to the vagaries of the economic jungle, this is one of the few active roles in which the INS and other
agencies can further the legislative intent of creating new United
States jobs and attracting capital investments. Accordingly, the INS,
the SEC, and other federal and state agencies should take this role
seriously.
Enforcement, however, is not the only action to be taken. Several
structural defects in the program should be remedied. Less than ten
percent of the available visas are being issued.2 3 This means that
90% of the potential new section 203(b)(5) related United States
jobs, up to 90,000 jobs, are not being created. Given the inauspicious
start of the immigrant investor program, there should be no false
optimism that in its present state, section 203(b)(5) will be able to
create a significant number of United States jobs.
Professionals involved with this program agree that the biggest
problem with the immigrant investor visa is the worldwide taxation
22. The Immigration Act of 1990 provides that it is unlawful for any person or
entity to forge, counterfeit, alter, or use a falsely made document in order to satisfy any
requirement of the Act. INA § 274C, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1) (Supp. 11 1990). The Act
also allows for civil penalties up to $5,000 for each fraudulent document pursuant to the
penalties specified in the INS Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 270.3. INA § 274, 8
U.S.C. § 1324C(d)(3)(a)(B) (Supp. 11 1990). The INS itself is now in a position to
assess substantial civil fines against fraudulent promoters who supply inaccurate financial
or legal documents about an enterprise or project in which those documents become part
of an immigrant investors application. Anyone, including an agent who works directly or
indirectly on behalf of an entity, e.g., new commercial enterprise for § 203(b)(5) purposes, can be fined for submitting a false document. INS Immigration Regulations, 8
C.F.R. § 270.1 (1992). Accordingly, if a project promoter submits false information
regarding future job creation or viability of the enterprise then the promoter would appear to be liable. INA § 274C.
23. The Act provides for approximately 10,000 annual visas under the immigrant
investor category. INA § 203(b)(5)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1153, amended by 8 U.S.C. §
1153(b)(5)(A) (Supp. 1992). The projected use of § 203(b)(5) immigrant visas for fiscal
1992 is unlikely to exceed 1,000 or 10% of the available quota. Skerrett, supra note 18.

effect. Pursuant to section 7701(b) of the Internal Revenue Code
(IRC), as an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence status,
a foreign national becomes a United States resident for tax purposes.24 Along with the desired green card status, any of the alien's
income streams are subject to taxation by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Limited pre-immigration tax planning measures can to
some degree soften the blow of this new United States tax bite on
the alien's worldwide income. 25 These steps, however, are only damage control. The tax planning options pale in comparison to those
available for the immigrant investors into Canada. 26 Thus, making a
foreign national a United States resident for tax purposes cuts off
many significant tax planning measures. Indeed, for some foreign
nationals the best tax planning approach is to give up United States
permanent residence status.
If the tax laws are such a deterrent to potential participants in the
immigrant investor program then an obvious solution is to change
the tax laws. Yet, this course of action is politically charged. Why
should the United States give preferential tax treatment to foreign
investors over United States citizens? The tax issue will continue to
dissuade foreign investors from coming. If investors do not come to
America, then they will not create flew United States jobs. Further,
they will nbt pay taxes to the United States Treasury on income generated from their United States investments. If their places were
filled in sufficient numbers by other foreign investors willing to accept these added tax liabilities for United States permanent residency status, then tax would be a non-issue.
But as.long as the quota for section 203(b)(5) is undersubscribed,
the number of new United States jobs anticipated by Congress from
this legislation will not be created. 28 The expected investments into
United States enterprises will not occur. The alien entrepreneurs
who have helped spawn the economic miracles of the Five Little
Tigers29 and other surging overseas economies will stay at home or
24. I.R.C. § 7701(b) (1988).
25. See Ronald E. Rose, U.S. Investor Visa Opens for Business, 20 INT'L Bus.
LAW. 4 (Apr. 1992) (citing typical pre-immigration tax planning methods such as accelerating receipt of ordinary income, realizing gain on highly appreciated capital assets,
and using foreign situs trusts for sheltering of assets and income).
26. Boidman, supra note 9, at 9-14.
27. William Norman, Foreign Investment into U.S. Real Estate, CALIFORNIA
CPA SocietY HANDBOOK (1991). Chapter 1 sets forth tax and financial planning strategies for foreign investors and advises strict avoidance of United States tax residency status. Id.
28. Endelman & Hardy, supra note 13 (citing 136 CONG. REc. S17112 (daily ed.
Oct. 26, 1990) (statement of Sen. Simon predicting that § 203(b)(5) would create
100,000 new jobs for Americans)).
29. The Five Little Tigers are a group of five Asian countries with significant economic growth over the last two decades. They include Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia.
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go to Canada. The promise of section 203(b)(5) will not be fulfilled.
A slight modification of section 7701(b) of the IRC to exclude from
United States tax resident status those individuals who obtained
United States lawful permanent residence status under section
203(b)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act would be a good
start toward solving this problem.
This statutory change would also have to deal with the substantial
presence issue. 30 Even if foreign nationals are not United States permanent residents they can still be United States tax residents, by
virtue of being physically present in the United States for a substantial period of time in a given year. Generally, an average stay in the
United States of more than 122 days per year will lead to a United
States tax resident status for a foreign national, even without green
card status. Individuals investing from $500,000 to $3,000,000 into a
United States enterprise will probably be in the United States for
more than 122 days a year in order to manage their investment.
Indeed, their active participation in the management of the United
States enterprise is required by law.31 Absence from the United
States for more than 243 days a year on a continuing basis will
cause an immigrant investor significant problems in maintaining his
permanent residence status. 32 Therefore, a comprehensive approach

30. 1. R. C. § 7701b(3) sets out the test for determining United States resident tax
status by virtue of substantial presence in the United States. The test spans three years,
counting all days in the present year, '1 of all days in the preceding year, and 1/6 of all
days in the final year. If the foreigner has spent 183 days of the current year in the
United States then he is generally a United States tax resident. Further, if his cumulative total over the last three years using the above cited allocation test is 183 days then
he is also a United States resident for tax purposes. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(3)(1988). Statistically, a foreigner will become a United States resident for tax purposes if he averages
more than 122 days a year in the country. There are limited exceptions to this general
rule based upon specific visa status, e.g., student, trainee, etc., as specified in §
7701(b)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 7701(b)(5) (1988). Also a closer
connection "tax home" exception is available in limited circumstances. I.R.C. §§
162(a)(2), 911(d)(3) (West Supp. 1992).
31. INS Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 204.6()(5) (1992) (requiring that
the alien is engaged in the management of the commercial enterprise, either through.the
exercise of day-to-day managerial control or through policy formulation, as opposed to
maintaining a purely passive role in the investment).
32. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(A) (1988) requires that a returning permanent resident must be returning from a "temporary visit abroad" to be readmitted to the United
States. Substantial absence abroad, e.g., 243 days a year on a consistent basis, could lead
to a factual determination that the alien is "residing" abroad as opposed to "visiting"
abroad. Accordingly, pursuant to the requirements of § 101 (a)(27)(A) the alien could be
refused admission to the United States.

to removing worldwide taxation as a deterrent for potential immigrant investors is to modify the definition of United States tax resident under section 7701 (b) of the IRC to completely dxempt section
203(b)(5) immigrants under both the immigration-status and physical-presence tests.
A compromise approach would be to keep immigrant investors as
United States residents for tax purposes, but insert special language
in the IRC to limit the tax rate for offshore income. For example, in
relation to Hong Kong investors, a specific change in title 22, section
42.72(e)(1)(iii) of the Code of Federal Regulations, could expand
the "back pocket" immigrant visa option to immigrant investors
from the colony. Under this program, certain classes of immigrants
can essentially complete all immigrant visa processing, but are provided until January 1, 2002 to enter the United States as lawfully
admitted permanent residents. This special concession for the people
of Hong Kong was added by section 154 of the Immigration Act of
1990.13 At present, section 203(b)(5) immigrant investors do not
qualify for this option. Because United States tax resident status
does not attach until such admission, the Hong Kong investor, if provided this option, could have the security of at-will United States
permanent residency, but avoid United States worldwide tax until
she takes that step.
Historically, the appropriate planning strategy to balance these
competing tax and immigration residency issues was to obtain an
E-234 or L-135 nonimmigrant visa for the foreign investor. The investor would then stay out of the United States the requisite period of
time to avoid United States tax residency status.36 This approach,
however, is not a perfect solution. First, although there is considerable flexibility built into both the E-2 and L-1 visas in terms of splitting time between the United States and abroad,3 7 a pattern of
spending two-thirds of the year outside of America could jeopardize
the investor's visa status. The specific problem with using the L-1 is
that it has a maximum duration of seven years. It is therefore not a
long-term solution.
33. INA § 154.
34. Issued pursuant to § 101(a)(15)(E)(ii) of the INA. 8 U.S.C.A. §
I l01(a)(15)(L) (West Supp. 1992).
35. Issued pursuant to § 101(a)(15)(L)(i) of the INA. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101
(a)(15)(E)(II) (West Supp. 1992).
36. The requisite period of time is less than 122 days a year. See supra note 32.
37. An L-1 visa holder need not be in the United States on a full time basis. See
supra note 35. The E-2 principal investor must be coming to the United States to
"develop and direct" the enterprise. See supra note 34. The "develop and direct" requirement, however, deals primarily with the issue of ownership control of the treaty
enterprise. In re Lee, 15 I. & N. Dec. 187 (Reg. Comm'r 1975). Frequent trips in and
out of the United States are generally considered to be within the allowable terms and
conditions of E-2 visas.
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The E-2 can be renewed indefinitely. Yet, the E-2 visa is limited
only to nationals of treaty countries. The biggest drawback to the
E-2 solution, however, is the extreme difficulty in converting the E-2
to permanent residency when the foreign investor is the majority or
significant owner of the United States enterprise. In order to qualify
for an E-2 visa, the foreign investor must demonstrate sufficient ability to "develop and direct" the enterprise. 8 The State Department
interprets this to mean that the foreign investor has controlling interest in the enterprise. While such a degree of ownership interest is
essential to get the original E-2 visa status, it is the kiss of death for
permanent residency purposes. The United States Department of
Labor has consistently held that such an ownership interest by the
alien renders the United States enterprise unable to conduct the
recruitment efforts required in the permanent labor certification
process. 39

The Department of Labor's hand in this position was considerably
strengthened by the recent decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Bulk Farms Inc. v. Martin.4" The opinion in that case
specifically held that Congress intended for section 203(b)(5) to be
used by foreign investors seeking to immigrate to the United
States. 4 Accordingly, anyone seeking permanent residence status
through investment into the United States needs to have deep pockets. An E-2 labor certification and permanent residency conversion is
not an option even if no qualified American will be displaced in the
38. In re Lee, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 189 (establishing that controlling interest in the
enterprise must be demonstrated in order to be qualified to develop and direct the business as contemplated in § 101(a)(15)(E)(ii)). Under Foreign Affairs Manual § 41.51,
note 5.5, less than 51% interest in the enterprise will usually mean that the alien does
not have requisite control to develop and direct the enterprise, especially in relation to
small companies. A 50% share interest may, however, qualify as requisite control, especially in cases involving major foreign corporations in which effective operational control
can be demonstrated through means other than direct controlling ownership interest.
39. See, e.g., In re Lignomat USA Ltd., 88 I.N.A. 276 (BALCA 1988); In re
Amger Corp., 87 I.N.A. 5456 (BALCA 1987); In re Edelweiss Mfg. Co., 87 I.N.A. 562
(BALCA 1987); In re Keyjoy Trading Co., 87 I.N.A. 592 (BALCA 1987). In 1989, a
federal court set down a two-prong test to determine whether good faith recruitment
could be conducted in cases in which the alien had an ownership in the sponsoring entity.
The test requires that the employer demonstrate that (1) the business is not merely a
"sham and a scheme" designed to obtain a labor certification for the alien investor and
(2) the business has not come to rely so heavily on the alien investor that it would cease
to exist without him. Hall v. McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868 (D.C. Cir. 1989). With at least
50%, and most likely 51%, ownership required for the initial E-2 visa a foreign investor
could probably not meet either the test in Hall v. McLaughlin or the BALCA standards.
40. 963 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1992).
41. Id. at 1288.

process. At the same time, foreign investors who have invested sums
up to $499,999 will be limited to E-2 status for the rest of their lives
unless they
can obtain permanent residence status through collateral
42
means.
Up-front structuring of the United States investment enterprise to
eventually qualify the alien for intra-company transfer labor certification exempt permanent residence processing is a favorite planning
mechanism that survived the Immigration and Naturalization Act of
1990 and was made even more important by Bulk Farms. The first
step is in place if the new United States enterprise is structured as
either a subsidiary or affiliate of a pre-existing foreign company. The
second factor is present if the foreign investor owns a majority interest in the foreign company or is able to substantially influence its
business decisions. The investor almost invariably holds executive or
managerial level status with the foreign company and likely has been
with that company for at least one year.43 Further, the investor has
the absolute power or sufficient bargaining power within the organization to swing a majority ownership vote to set up and operate a
United States subsidiary or affiliate business.
Such a structure allows for an initial L-1 visa for the foreign
investor and also an E-2 visa if the investor is a treaty national. Conversion to permanent residency could later be made by utilizing the
statutory exemption to avoid the labor certification problem. This
procedure is now incorporated into the employer-sponsored first-preference priority worker immigrant visa category. 44 This option, however, is not available to all foreign investors, especially those who
gained their wealth through working for others as opposed to
through their own entrepreneurial activities. Senator Paul Simon
was probably referring to this planning mechanism when in the Congressional debates he quoted Senator Bumpers' observation that
"anybody with a million bucks and a good immigration lawyer can
stay down." 45 If anything, this planning mechanism was made more
desirable by the changes in the L-1 and priority worker definitions

42. Collateral means indicates other traditional forms of obtaining United States
permanent residence either through sponsorship by a close family relative who is a
United States, citizen or permanent resident, sponsorship as an employee in a position
where qualified United States workers cannot be found, or through other means such as
diversity immigration pursuant to § 203(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
43. INA § 203(b)(1)(c) (requiring that in order to qualify as a priority worker
category immigrant the alien must have been employed by the foreign company in at
least one of the preceding three years).
44. INA § 203(b)(I)(c) (allowing for immigrant status for certain multinational
executives and managers without the need for a prior labor certification).
45. 135 CONG. REc. S7772 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen. Simon).
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that added the concept of functional managers.4"
Although the functional manager has helped this planning structure by exempting labor certification for the foreign investor, it is
still not ideal. The number of employees required in United States
enterprise in order for an individual to be characterized as a manager or executive remains elusive despite express statutory language
that the reasonable needs of the organization must be taken into account when the number of employees are used as a factor in determining whether an individual is acting in a managerial or executive
capacity. Further, the INS determination shall not be based merely
on the number of employees that the individual will supervise or direct.47 The INS adjudicator, however, may still perceive the overall
management responsibilities and duties of the priority worker immigrant visa applicant according to the number of employees in the
enterprise. Thus, the number of employees could remain the essential
basis for a denial dressed in other statutorily permissible language.
One of the great advantages of the immigrant investor visa is that
it provides bright-line tests. Ten full-time employees is the brass
ring. Such certainty is not available to foreign investors using the
labor certification exemption green card route. In this respect, the
labor certification exemption is an inferior option to the new immigrant investor visa, especially for many typical investments in the
$1,000,000 and under range in which the need for a foreign transferred executive or manager is often seriously questioned by the INS
(e.g., motels, restaurants, retirement homes, and small markets).
Those with less than $500,000 who cannot qualify for section
203(b)(5) and are not likely to qualify as a labor certification beneficiary due to Bulk Farms48 must still face the uncertainties of the
labor certification exemption if they desire United States permanent
46. INA § 101(a)(44), 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(44) (1992). This section lists the definitions of managerial capacity for both L-1 visa and priority worker immigrant visa issuance purposes and significantly includes management of an essential function of an
organization or essential function of a department or subdivision of the organization.
Further, the definition specifically states that if no other employee is directly supervised,
the alien will qualify for visa issuance if the alien "functions at a senior level within the
organizational hierarchy or with respect to the function managed." Id. This statutory
language was primarily designed to remedy situations in which an executive of a large
organization directs substantial business activity but directly supervises no employees.
See In re Irish Dairy Bd., No. A28845421 (Administrative Appeals Unit, Nov. 16,
1989). The statute represents a departure from the traditional Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) requirement of significant numbers of directly supervised employees as a condition of visa issuance, which can be helpful to the foreign investor's case.
47. INA § 101(a)(44)(c).
48. 963 F.2d at 1286.

residence.
Another drawback to the intracompany transferee approach is
that the foreign investor must continue to operate the overseas business until the investor obtains final permanent residence status.4 9
Some investors intend to cash out of the foreign enterprise and concentrate their money and time on the United States venture. Many
times they are the driving force behind the foreign business and their
absence leaves the economic fate of the operation to inexperienced
hands or indifferent minds. Accordingly, the requirement presents a
risk that the foreign investors may incur business losses from their
overseas operations until they have obtained United States permanent residence status.
In summary, changes in the tax code eliminating or sufficiently
softening the worldwide taxation problem could attract more foreign
investors under section 203(b)(5) and greatly simplify the immigration planning process. The section 203(b)(5) requirements of ten
jobs and $1,000,000 investment (or $500,000 for targeted zones) are
objective tests and provide certainty for the investor, attorneys, and
the INS. Taking steps in the tax area to steer foreign investors into
section 203(b)(5) would be the best single step that Congress could
take to realize the original promise of job creation and to provide a
more straight-forward procedure for obtaining United States immigrant status through personal investment.
Failure to act on the tax issue will mean that the complicated,
imperfect intracompany planning approach will still be used. Substantial foreign investors will have orders from their United States
tax advisers to stay a nonimmigrant as long as possible and to stay in
the United States no more than 121 days a year. More and more
foreign entrepreneurs will make gifts of $1,000,000 to their spouses
or children who will then invest the money in a United States enterprise and obtain immigrant investor status in the process. In the
meantime, the actual entrepreneur in the family stays clear of
United States taxes on the business holdings abroad but secures
future stability for the family by obtaining United States residence
status for the children or spouse. The entrepreneur can then come to
the United States on a B-1 or B-2 visa to visit the family. Absent tax
changes, such a planning approach is likely to become widespread.
This approach has two distinct disadvantages for America. First, it
virtually forces family dislocations due to the requirements for maintenance of permanent residence status imposed upon the children or
49. 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(l)(1)(ii)(6), as amended in 1987, requires that during the
duration of the visa status the foreign entity must be doing business. This regulation
overturned prior case law allowing the visa status to remain valid even if the foreign
entity ceased business operations. In re Thompson, 18 . & N. Dec. 169 (Comm'r 1981).
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spouse immigrant investors.5 0 Meanwhile, the tax rules require the
substantial absence of the entrepreneur from the United States to
prevent becoming a United States tax resident by staying too long. 5 1
The use of re-entry permits by the spouse or child may be a bandage
on this problem, but it is not a long-term solution.52 Second, this
next-generation approach means that the real entrepreneur in the
family, the individual with the proven business track record, stays
abroad while the inexperienced come to America. The law should be
structured to attract the best overseas entrepreneurs available.
Unless changes are made, the people who have demonstrated the talent to build businesses and create jobs will remain in their own countries. America and its employment picture will be the worse for it.
II.

AT-RISK PROVISIONS AND SECOND-STAGE INVESTMENTS

A troubling issue that arises time after time in the structuring of
deals aimed at the immigrant investors is how far the foreign investor must ultimately be at risk in order to meet the at-risk provisions
of section 203(b)(5). Congress and the INS essentially incorporated
the at-risk provisions of the E-2 visa into the immigrant investor
visa. The E-2 visa requires that the foreign investor's investment into
the United States enterprise be at risk in the commercial sense. 53 To
show that the petitioner has invested or is actively in the process of
investing the required capital, the petition must be accompanied by
evidence that the petitioner has placed the required amount of capital at risk for the purpose of generating a return on the capital
placed at risk. Evidence of mere intent to invest or of prospective
investment arrangements entailing no present commitment is not
sufficient. The petitioner must show actual commitment of the
50.

INA § 101(a)27(A). See also supra note 32. To be readmitted, an alien must

be returning to the United States from a "temporary" absence abroad. INS Immigration
Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 211.1(b)(2) (1992). Additionally, case law, including In re
Kane, 15 I. & N. Dec. 258 (BIA 1975), has found returning permanent residents excludable from the United States due to insufficient time spent in the United States and lack
of adequate ties.
51. See supra note 30.
52. A permanent resident may apply for a re-entry permit to use as an entry document to re-enter the United States after a "temporary absence" abroad of up to two
years. It is possible to apply for multiple re-entry permits, but by doing so the INS may
seriously evaluate whether the individual continues to have an intention to remain a permanent resident. Accordingly, abuse of re-entry permits could lead to deportation or
exclusion proceedings based upon a finding that the individual has abandoned their residency in the United States. INA § 223; 8 C.F.R. § 223.1 (1992).
53. U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, 22 C.F.R. § 41.51 n.5-1-1

(1992).

required amount of capital. 4 Acceptable evidence includes: deposits
into the United States enterprise bank account by the investor; stock
issuances by the United States enterprise in exchange for money
transfers from the alien; invoices or receipts for assets purchased for
the United States enterprise by the alien; evidence of property transferred to the United States enterprise by the alien investor such as
bills of lading, commercial entry documents, or transit insurance policies; loan or mortgage agreements in which the funds are secured by
the assets of the alien investor, but not those of the United States
enterprise, and in which the alien investor is personally and primarily liable on the loan.55
At first glance, the typical investor would seem not to have a problem meeting the at-risk requirements. Such compliance also should
be easily documented. The real complexity, however, comes into play
in two-stage immigrant investments. In many contemplated major
investments under the immigrant investor program the initial company will be set up as a limited partnership, limited liability company, or corporation, and the foreign investors will make the
necessary amount of investment into this new United States enterprise. At this stage, the requirement that the alien investor has actually committed the funds and made the investment into the United
States enterprise will seem to have been met. Indeed, a strict reading
of the regulations implies that this should be the end of the at-risk
inquiry.56 How the company then utilizes the money would arguably
not affect the alien investor as he is at risk with respect to his investment into the United States enterprise.
This may not, however, be the end of the inquiry in certain twostage investments. For example, alien investors may fund the United
States enterprise with the intent that the enterprise will invest a substantial part of those monies into a venture, such as an existing or
new hotel, in which the monies invested by the enterprise are guaranteed a minimum return on the investment. The guaranteed return
for the enterprise from the venture by extension should not make the
original investment of the alien into the enterprise not at risk. The
potential scope of the at-risk requirement becomes a concern under
circumstances when $20,000,000 or more is invested by a pool of
alien investors who ultimately expect United States permanent residency status and a relatively risk-free, minimum return on investment. On one hand, the regulations require that the aliens'
54. INS Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(2) (1992).
55. INS Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(2)(i-v) (1992).
56. INS Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j) (1992). The alien must
submit evidence that he has invested or is in the process of investing lawfully obtained
capital in a new commercial enterprise.No further showing is required under the regulations. Id.
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investment be at risk in the commercial sense. On the other hand,
the aliens want a guaranteed return.
Do these interests conflict with no hope of co-existing under section 203(b)(5)? The answer lies in the word guarantee. A thirdparty guarantee of a second-stage investment does not really remove
commercial risk for the immigrant investor. In this situation, many
potential risks are still present. These remaining risks arguably suffice to preserve the entrepreneurial nature of the investment.
Solvency of the guarantor is the first major uncertainty in such an
investment structure. These guarantees, even if made by banks,
would not be supported by. a Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC) guarantee or any other full faith and credit guarantees by
federal or state government. 57 Therefore, the security of the immigrant investors capital depends soley on the financial solvency of the
private guarantor. Such a guarantee would be rendered meaningless
if the guarantor filed for bankruptcy. In an era when major financial
institutions have been closed by federal regulators, prominent real
estate developers and retailers have filed for bankruptcy, and the
State of California has paid debts with I.O.U.-styled registered warrants, nothing is guaranteed.
Examination of other areas of the law dealing with at-risk issues
in the commercial sector support the finding that third-party guarantees do not remove risk for the immigrant investor. The FDIC has
set its own at-risk criteria to provide guidelines on how much capital
a bank must keep on hand to get or maintain the FDIC guarantee. 58
The required amount of capital on hand increases under the guidelines depending upon the risk factors present in their loan portfolios.
The criteria creates four broad risk categories that focus on the obligor, the guarantor, and the nature of the collateral. Significantly,
this criteria assigns commercial loans a 100 % risk weight. The guarantors or obligors on these types of loans will be the same types of
persons who would issue third-party guarantees to immigrant investors. Under the FDIC criteria, this 100% risk factor can be reduced
if the collateral or guarantor have special characteristics, almost
none of which would be present in an immigrant investor situation. 59
57. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation guarantees apply only to deposits
in a savings institution. Deposits are not involved in situations in which the savings institution is a partner in a business venture or has offered a buy-back option at a guaranteed
rate of return if the foreign investors will take a foreclosed business off its hands then.
Accordingly, no government-backed guarantees would apply.
58. 12 C.F.R. pt. 325, app. A (statement of policy on risk-based capital).
59. The characteristics indicated involved loans backed by specified governmental

Accordingly, under the FDIC's risk assessment criteria, an immigrant investor would usually be 100% at risk that the guarantee by
a private third-party guarantor could fail.
The "risk capital" test developed in the securities area also
strengthens the case for immigrant investors. In InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel,60 the United States Supreme Court
held that the critical factor in differentiating a security from a loan
is whether there is a reasonable expectation of profits from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. A third-party guarantee differs from a loan because the guarantee only protects the
low-end of the immigrant investment, in other words, provides a
guaranteed minimum return, but provides for an unlimited high-end
in profits. Furthermore, because limited partnership status qualifies
under section 203(b)(5), the expectation and amount of profits can
be dependent upon the entrepreneurial and managerial efforts of a
general partner.
This also holds true in second-stage investments in which the
immigrant investor invests in the new United States commercial enterprise, which in turn invests into a further venture. The profitability of that second-stage venture depends upon the management
decisions and input of members of several participating entities.
Therefore, the immigrant investor, whatever his or her role in the
initial United States enterprise, will see profits rise and fall depending to some extent on the managerial and entrepreneurial skills of
others. The third-party guarantee only provides a floor for determining how far the profits can fall. Whether the profits will fall through
the floor and become losses then depends upon the contractual compliance and financial solvency of the guarantor. Thus, the risk test
under International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel seems to
have been met.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has also developed a risk capital test in the securities area."' Their criteria as stated in Great
Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz examined factors including: (1) time,
(2) collateral, (3) form of obligation, (4) relationship between
amount borrowed and the size of the borrower's business, and (5)
intended use of the funds. Under these tests, the two-stage immigrant investment backed by a third-party guarantee should qualify
as risk capital because the form of the obligation, time for repayment, collateral (or lack thereof), and other relevant factors would
mitigate against a finding of nonrisk loan-type transaction.
The risk capital test in Elson v. Geiger62 also supports the at-risk
units or
60.
61.
62.

lending institutions backed by government guarantees.
439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979).
Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1257-58 (9th Cir. 1976).
506 F. Supp. 238 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
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nature of these investments. Investment rights and an emphasis on
capital appreciation were key factors in distinguishing a security
from a loan. Certainly one of the major investment goals of the
immigrant investors is the eventual reaping of capital gains based
upon appreciation of the properties held by the United States enterprise or second-stage venture. Additionally, the immigrant investor
has significant rights to control and direct the investment as compared to a lender. Therefore, the Elson test for risk capital would be
met.
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Carman63 also used risk
capital criteria in a slightly unusual securities fraud application. In
Carman, the owner of a vocational school sold federally insured student loans owed to him by students to credit unions at full face
value. The credit unions expected to receive a set rate of return on
the fixed interest loans. The court, however, held that the value and
the ultimate return on the acquired loans received, by the credit
unions depended upon the managerial and entrepreneurial skills of
the school owner because eventual repayment of the full loan
amounts depended upon all students completing their studies. Additional conditions of receiving full loan repayment included that the
school stay in business and continue to have eligibility for FDIC loan
guarantees.
If students dropped out, their amount owed on the promissory note
held by the credit union would be reduced, and thus the total interest income on that loan would be reduced. Further, if the school
were improperly managed and went out of business, all of the loans
would be significantly devalued as the credit union would have to
give reductions in principal to the students to reflect courses not
taken due to the school's demise. Finally, if the school lost the accreditation required to allow its students to get FDIC-backed loans
to pay for tuition then the prospects of repayment would be significantly lessened. Thus, the credit unions relied to some extent on the
managerial and entrepreneurial skills of the school owner.
Similarly, a section 203(b)(5) immigrant investment would be
considered risk capital under the Carman holding because his total
return on investment would be subject to the second-stage venture
and to the guarantor remaining in business and remaining profitable.
In Carman, the court considered an investment involving such a
seemingly secure instrument as an FDIC-backed student loan to be
63.

577 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 1977).

risk capital. Such a holding establishes that monies invested by alien
entrepreneurs into a United States enterprise, even if re-invested into
second-stage third-party guaranteed ventures, should be considered
at risk in the commercial sense.
Additional risk factors present for the immigrant investors include
liability suit judgments- or creditor judgments being enforced against
either the United States commercial enterprise or the second-stage
venture. Furthermore, uninsured or uninsurable casualty losses such
as earthquake damages or environmental hazards could deal a financial blow to the United States enterprise or the second-stage venture
that would render the third-party guarantee meaningless. The totality of risks facing the immigrant investor, even in a second-stage
third-party guaranteed investment structure, leave the investor ultimately at risk in the commercial sense, especially in light of federal
court decisions involving risk in the commercial area and regulatory
criteria established by the FDIC and other federal agencies. Such a
conclusion is also consistent
with previously reported
E-2 cases involving at-risk issues. 64
III.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
AND FRAUDULENT PROMOTERS

A final significant chilling factor in the immigrant investor program is the financial disclosure requirements contained in the INS
regulations. 65 The statute itself was silent on the need for such disclosures. Apparently the genesis for disclosures was the defeated
amendment introduced by Senator Dale Bumpers attempting to
eliminate section 203(b)(5) immigrant investors from the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990.6 The question raised is whether
the Congressional record provides a sufficient basis for the INS to
promulgate regulations requiring detailed financial disclosures from
immigrant investor applicants when the statute itself is silent on the
matter.
Senator Bumpers declared on the floor of the Senate that section
64. In re Heitland, 14 1. & N. Dec. 563 (BIA 1974). Heitland as well as almost
all previously reported immigration at-risk cases only dealt with the issue of whether
funds had been committed to the United States enterprise. In Heitland, uncommitted
funds held in a bank account were not considered at risk. Neither Heitland nor any other
prior E-2 case addressed the issue of second-stage third-party guaranteed investments.
65. INS Immigration Regulations, 8 C.F.R. § 204.6(j)(3) (1992). The documents
that must be disclosed to show that the money invested into the United States was
obtained through lawful means include corporate, partnership, and personal tax returns
filed anywhere within the last five years, other evidence identifying any other source of
capital and certified copies of judgements or evidence of pending civil or criminal proceedings against the petitioner within the past 15 years.
66. Amendment No. 246 to Public Law 101-649, cited as the Immigration Act of
1990, 135 CONG. REc. S7768 (daily ed. July 12, 1989).
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203(b)(5) is a "a drug dealers dream.

'67

Senator Ted Kennedy, the

sponsor of the legislation, responded to Mr. Bumpers characteriza-

tion by stating:
The idea that is suggested by the Senator from Arkansas' argument that
with the passage of their bill we are somehow aiding and assisting drug
users, those involved in drug trafficking, facilitating their coming to the
United States, is unworthy of a response ....

The Senator from Arkansas

understands that, or certainly should understand. And to try and suggest
otherwise either demonstrates he has not read the bill or does not know
or the procedures which are required
about the enforcement procedures
under the immigration bill."8

Senator Kennedy, who is involved in immigration legislation to a
greater degree than almost any member of the Congress, has a bet-

ter grasp of the options available to the INS in dealing with alien
drug dealers. The INS has a.plethora of legal grounds upon which to

stop drug traffickers from immigrating to the United States. The
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990 only
strengthen their hand in that regard. Still, Senator Bumpers in his
rebuttal to Senator Kennedy continued to sound the alarm about

section 203(b)(5) creating a beachhead for drug dealers. He replied:
He [Senator Kennedy] said drug dealers do not have anything to do with
this. I divinely hope he is right. But I can tell you one thing. There is not
anything to keep a drug dealer out....

[I]n this category you may be

getting a bank robber instead of a drug dealer. You may be getting someI am not trying to stop investment
one who is on the lam from the law ....
in this country. I am trying to stop69what I see as an outrageous opportunity
for fraud and evasion of the law.

The same issue is raised in the Judiciary Committee Report submit-

ted by Senator Joseph Biden. The relevant passage reads: "Finally
the committee intends that processing of an individual visa not continue under this Section if it becomes known to the Government that
the money invested was obtained by the alien through other than

legal means (such as money received through the sale of illegal
drugs)."70

No one advocates that drug dealers or other criminals should be
admitted as section 203(b)(5) immigrants by investing unlawfully
obtained money. The practical questions are whether the regulatory

imposed financial disclosures are necessary to deter such activity and
whether the disclosure requirements do more harm than good. The

concern of potential immigrant investors is not so much what the
67. 135 CONG. REC.
68. 135 CONG. REC.
69. 135 CONG. REC.
70. S. REP. No. 55,

S7769 (daily
S7771 (daily
S7773 (daily
101st Cong.,

ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
1st Sess. 21 (1989).

INS will do with the information but who else will have access to the
information. The model United States tax treaty with other governments includes an information exchange clause. In comparison,
neither the United Nations model treaty nor the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) model treaty have
such a clause. Thus, the United States has a relatively liberal
approach to information sharing. Accordingly, information given to
the INS is likely to wind up with the home country government.
Potential investors are genuinely concerned with how that government will utilize the information. This concern has to date been an
additional factor discouraging potential immigrant investors.
The position of Senator Bumpers is that error should be on the
side of disclosure. If some legitimate investors are scared off, then so
be it, as long as the regulations have the desired effect of weeding
out drug dealers-or other criminals. Nevertheless, the role of the
INS is not to rewrite the statute. These regulations are arguably
ultra vires. They exceed the rule making powers of the INS. If Congress wanted such disclosures then it could have inserted language to
that effect.
The Congressional record indicates that Senator Bumpers asserted
his positions about the potential of section 203(b)(5) being used by
criminals as a justification for passing his amendment to delete the
immigrant investor category from the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1990. 72 His amendment was voted down. 73 Senator Kennedy,
the sponsor of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990, stated
on the Senate Floor that section 203(b)(5) was not a vehicle for foreign criminals to invest illicitly earned money into the United States.
Senator Kennedy further indicated that there were adequate enforcement procedures available to keep this from happening both
generally and in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1990
itself."4 The other sponsor of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1990, Senator Alan Simpson, also voted against the Bumpers
amendment, as did key Senate Judiciary Committee member Senator Paul Simon.75
Arguably, the views expressed by Senator Kennedy, who was the
sponsor of the overall bill and the victor in the showdown on the
Bumpers amendment, accurately reflected the intent of Congress on
this point. In other words, Congress felt that sufficient procedural
U.S. MODEL TAX TREATY, Art. 26, 1 3 (1981).
72. 135 CONG. REC. S7773 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Bumpers).
73. 135 CONG. REC. 57775 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (on a roll call vote the
Bumpers amendment was voted down 56 to 43 with one abstention).
74. 135 CONG. REC. S7771 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
75. 135 CONG. REC. S7775 (daily ed. July 12, 1989) (listing Senators voting for
and against Bumpers amendment).

71.
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safeguards existed to stop criminals from funneling money from
illicit activities into the United States and getting permanent residency in the process. Further safeguards imposed by the INS were
not only unnecessary, but unwanted, especially if those new safeguards impeded the goal of increased United States job creation by
means of foreign capital investments.
The language in the Judiciary Committee Report could conceivably be used as a basis for the INS disclosure regulations .7 The passage, however, indicates that the Committee intended that the
processing of a visa should not continue if it becomes known that the
money invested was obtained through illegal means. This implies
that if, in the course of normal visa processing, it becomes known
that the money used is illicit funds then the case should be denied.
As mentioned by Senator Kennedy, several procedures presently in
force can derail applications by criminals trying to immigrate under
section 203(b)(5). The primary existing procedural safeguard is that
anyone attempting to immigrate to the United States must submit
police certificates from any country that he or she has lived in for
more than six months." If the prospective immigrant investor has
ever been arrested or convicted then it would "become known" to the
United States Consular Officer abroad and the immigrant visa would
not be issued. 71 Accordingly, the drug dealer or other criminal would
never make it to America.
This begs the question of a drug dealer who has never been
arrested or convicted. Section 212(a)(2)(c) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act allows the consular officer abroad or the immigration inspector at the port of entry to exclude any alien who they
know or have reason to believe is or has been an illicit trafficker in
any controlled substance (or is or has been a knowing assister, abettor, conspirator, or colluder with others in the illicit trafficking in
any controlled substance). This provides a very wide legal net to
ensnare and exclude from the United States any foreign national
who has connections with drug trafficking.
Given recent events, the assumption that foreign drug dealers will
try to immigrate to the United States under section 203(b)(5) using
their ill-gotten gains seems almost ludicrous. In a recent case, the
76. S. REP. No. 55, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1989).
77. U.S. Department of State Foreign Affairs Manual, 22 C.F.R. § 42.65 (1992).
78. Aliens convicted of crimes of moral turpitude or of crimes relating to controlled substances are generally excludable pursuant to § 212(a)(2) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act.

United States Supreme Court authorized kidnapping by the Drug
Enforcement Agency to drag a drug trafficker into the United
States.7 9 In the case of Manuel Noriega, the United States government sent troops into a foreign country to apprehend him and escort
him back for prosecution. Other notorious Colombian drug dealers,
including Pablo Escobar have made no extradition to the United
States a condition of their surrender to local police authorities. 80
Apparently, the absolute last thing that foreign drug dealers want is
to have contact with the United States. Immigrating. to America
would be the equivalent of signing their own arrest warrant.
In addition, section 212(a)(3)(A)(ii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act allows the consular officer or the Attorney General
to exclude any alien who they have reason to believe seeks to enter
the United States to engage solely, principally, or incidentally in unlawful activity. This section could be used to exclude anyone who is
reasonably suspected of being involved in illicit activities in their
home country because taking money derived from illegal activities
and investing it into a legitimate United States business would constitute a violation of money laundering statutes.
Furthermore, many drug dealers or other criminals could be
excluded from the United States as terrorists under section
212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Terrorist
activity is defined in section 212(1)(3)(B)(ii)(II) as the seizing or
detaining and threatening to kill, injure, or to detain another individual in order to compel a third person, including a governmental organization, to' do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or
implicit condition for release of the individual seized or detained.
This section could be used to exclude anyone reasonably suspected of
being involved in terrorist activities in their home country.
In summary, the United States government has broad powers to
stop anyone who is in any way engaged in criminal activity from
immigrating to the United States. The basis for the exclusion can
either be prior convictions or reasonable suspicion or belief of criminal activity. A potential criminal immigrant investor would come to
the attention of either the INS or the consular officer prior to his
admission into the United States as a lawful permanent resident with
the intelligence resources the United States government has at its
disposal through the Drug Enforcement Agency, Central Intelligence
Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, United States Customs
Service, INS, Interpol, and information sharing arrangements with
79.

United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992).
EcONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1992, at 35.
The article lists conditions for surrender of Pablo Escobar and states: "Above all, he was
guaranteed against extradition to face trial in the United States, where the verdict would
have been sure and the punishment condign." Id.

80. See Colombia, The Escobar Escapade, THE
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foreign police and other intelligence services.
Provided that the disclosure requirements contained in the INS
regulations were not envisioned by Congress and are overreaching in
that their net effect is contrary to legislative intent, the question
becomes whether there is a sufficient legal basis to strike them down.
The answer likely lies somewhere in the opinion of the United States
Supreme Court in Chevron USA v. Natural Resources Defense
Counsel."' Chevron has become the leading case in determining the
validity of agency regulations when the statute itself does not speak
plainly on the issue.
Chevron seemingly sets a high hurdle for those who wish to strike
down the INS disclosure requirements. If the statute is silent on an
issue, but there is an express delegation by Congress to a federal
agency to fill in the gap, then the agency interpretation can only be
struck down if it was arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to
the statute.8 2 Arguably no gap exists in this statute. Congress was
opposed to disclosure requirements, as evidenced by Senator Kennedy's statement on the Senate floor. Further, Congress made no
express delegation to create such disclosure requirements. If anything, the delegation was implicit. Under Chevron, in an implicit delegation the court may not substitute its own construction of a
statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by an
agency.83 This hurdle is much lower than arbitrary, capricious, or
manifestly contrary to the statute. The question then is was it reasonable for the INS to insert the disclosure requirements in the regulations in light of the wording and intent of the statute.
The INS has previously argued justification for a regulation under
Chevron and lost.8 4 Cardoza-Fonsecav. INS dealt with the issue of
whether the standards for adjudicating political asylum under section 208(a) differed from those used in adjudicating withholding of
deportation under section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. The precedental value of Cardoza-Fonsecain an attack against
the INS disclosure regulations may, however, be of limited value as
that case concerned the direct comparison and interpretation of two
separate statutes. The case involved clear reference points that
81. 476 U.S. 837 (1984).
82. Id. at 843 (citing United States v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 834 (1984);
Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 44 (1981); Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416,
424-26 (1977)).
83. Id. (citing INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 (1981); Train v. Natural
Resources Defence Council, 421 U.S. 60, 75 (1975)).
84. Cardoza-Fonseca v. INS, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).

allowed the court to exercise pure statutory construction. In a challenge to the present INS regulations, the court would have to speculate as to whether section 203(b)(5) contemplated such disclosure
requirements. This requires the court to some extent to get inside the
head of Congress, which it may not be willing to do. Cardoza-Fonseca does however remain a case in which the INS asserted the
Chevron shield and lost. In that respect alone, the case may hold
some value in a challenge to the regulations.
Beyond this, the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. United
Food and Commercial Workers Union85 cited Cardoza-Fonsecain
holding that agency interpretations that are not long standing are
afforded substantially less deference by the courts.88 The INS disclosure regulations are relatively new and have not produced any significant detrimental reliance, thus, they would presumably not be given
the respect afforded other long-standing regulations. The holding of
the Supreme Court in Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed
Veterans of America8" cited such long-standing interpretation as a
major factor in refusing to overturn a challenged regulation. Longevity, therefore, is a factor.
Another factor the courts consider in deferring to agency interpretation of the statute is whether the issue involves technical areas in
which significant expertise is held by the agency.8 8 Yet, the immigrant investor disclosure requirements are not based upon any scientific or technical expertise, in contrast with the Environmental
Protection Agency in Chevron and the Federal Reserve Board in
Security Industries Ass'n v. Board of Government of the Federal
Reserve Board.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Alaska89 also cited Chevron to uphold a broad interpretation of the Army Corps of Engineers
of the Rivers and Harbors Act. This recent holding bodes badly for
any challenge to the INS disclosure regulations as it broadly interpreted Chevron to give wide latitude to the agency. Significant differences, however, exist between this case and a potential challenge
to the INS disclosure requirements. The statute in Alaska gave very
broad, express delegation to the Army Corps of Engineers to decide
under what conditions an obstruction to any navigable waters of the
United States would be allowed. Secondly, the statute was very old,
passed in 1899, and the Corps of Engineers interpretation of the
statute had been consistent for almost 100 years. Therefore,
85.

484 U.S. 112 (1987).

87.

477 U.S. 597 (1986).

86.

NLRB v. United Food and Commercial Workers Union, 484 U.S. 112 (1987).

88. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Gov't of the Fed. Reserve Bd., 468 U.S.
137 (1983).
89. 112 S.Ct. 1606 (1992).
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although United States v. Alaska generally supports deference to
agency interpretation, the facts are distinguishable. Accordingly, any
weight given to traditional evidence of legislative intent would weigh
out on the side of striking down the disclosure regulations.
Notwithstanding, if Professor Maureen Callahan correctly reads
Justice Scalia's leanings in statutory construction and his influence
over the court in this area, then this may be a false hope.90 As an
advocate of a broad interpretation of Chevron, and a disbeliever in
most, if not all, uses of congressional records to establish a legislative
intent contrary to agency interpretation, Scalia would probably
uphold the INS regulations. In his concurring opinion in Wisconsin
Public Intervenor v. Mortimer,9 Scalia totally discounted the validity of traditional tools of determining legislative intent such as committee reports or floor debates. He remains convinced that all
members of the Congress do not read the committee reports.
Accordingly, their vote for a bill does not mean they subscribe to all
statements in the committee reports.
If, however, more moderate heads prevail, then the disclosure
requirements could be struck down. Any factual evidence displaying
an adverse impact upon legitimate potential immigrant investors due
to these disclosure requirements would likely be helpful in supporting a challenge to the regulations. A successful challenge would
streamline the application process and, more importantly, would
increase the number of the applicants and create more United States
jobs.
CONCLUSION

The recommended changes to make section 203(b)(5) a vital, jobcreating provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act include
the following.
First, modify the Internal Revenue Code to eliminate the global
tax effect of participation in the United States immigrant investor
program in line with the Canadian model. Second, clarify the at-risk
provisions to specifically qualify second-stage third-party guaranteed
investments. Third, rigorously enforce existing regulatory safeguards
to weed out fraudulent promoters. Fourth, remove the financial disclosure requirements from the regulations.
90. Maureen Callahan, Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretationsof Statutes:
The Current Status of Chevron v. NDRC, 2 IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAW
HANDBOOK 482 (1991-92).
91. 111 S. Ct. 2476 (1991).

Failure to take these actions will condemn section 203(b)(5) to a
stunted existence. Both the quality and quantity of investors will fall
below expectations unless the needed changes are made.

